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” Words aw but the shadow of actions.” 
Democritus 
Young children’s apparently sophisticated understanding of language is ex- 
plained by a simple heuristic which produces responses fortuitously appropriate 
to many of the messages directed to them. Specifically, the strategy recruits action 
responses to language unless some element, either linguistic or nonlinguistic, 
indicates otherwise. Two experiments tested for the existence of the heuristic by 
examining the responses ofchildren, lY-34 months of age, to sentences susceptible 
of more than one interpretation. In the first experiment such sentences 
weir spoker~ in as ueul~al a coutexl as possible. 111 lltr second, the same 
sorts of sentences were presented in contexts supporting either action or 
informing responses. The results of both experiments indicate that young children 
interpret and respond to language in terms of an action-based strategy. Moreover, 
the observed effects of context show that even young children engage in a con- 
tinuous, context-sensitive process of interpretation. The data are discussed with 
regard to speech act theory and its role in adevelopmental theory of understanding. 
Young children are quite adept at behaving in ways that make their 
parents believe they understand what is said to them (cf. Huttenlocher, 
1974). For example, a parent who wanted her child to put a doll in a toy 
swing said, “Why don’t you put her on there?” The child placed the doll 
on the swing. This same child was barely able to produce two-word 
utterances. Observations like this have sometimes been taken as evidence 
that young children have extensive competence in the linguistic code, 
the set of formal rules which governs the production and comprehension 
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272 MARILYN SHATZ 
of grammatical sentences, but that this competence is not manifest in 
production simply because of “performance” deficiencies. An alternative 
view is presented here: Children’s apparent understanding results not from 
their sophisticated decoding of the linguistic signal but from the way the 
human processing system generally constructs interpretations of com- 
municative interactions and from the specific kinds of preferred repre- 
sentational heuristics young children bring to the task of understanding 
and responding to the language spoken to them. 
This paper provides a theoretical account of the child’s early system 
for responding to linguistic interactions and possible sources of develop- 
ment in that system. Two experiments which tested the response model 
by examining responses to utterances that can be interpreted in more 
than one way are presented as evidence for the system. 
A DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSING MODEL OF INTERPRETATION 
Understanding and Misunderstanding Messages in Context 
Participants in conversations use their messages to create a shared 
mental space, producing in their listeners awareness of some part of their 
external or internal world. Understanding involves the listeners’ repre- 
senting the messages sent to them in just the way that the senders in- 
tended them to be represented. Misunderstanding occurs when listeners 
represent messages in ways other than those intended. But whether 
or not the representations they arrive at are the ones intended, listeners 
carry out processes of interpretation-or assignments of meaning. In 
doing so, they take account of a variety of the elements-both linguistic 
and nonlinguistic-available in communicative situations to construct the 
most plausible interpretations of what they hear as well as responses 
appropriate to those interpretations. 
Moreover, communicative interactions occur in the context of partici- 
pants’ broader, continuous representational processes, and interpreta- 
tions of those interactions are integrated with them to sustain con- 
sistent world views. (See Bransford & McCarrell, 1974; Gunter, 1974; 
and Rommetveit, 1974; for representative discussions of adults’ integrative 
processes leading to interpretations oflanguage.) Language, then, does not 
always have to express fully and unambiguously a speaker’s intentions. 
Indeed, a language which did so would be unnecessarily inefficient given 
that language users tap other sources of information as well in the com- 
municative process. Each of the sources of information constrains the set 
of acceptable interpretations a message can convey. The more the 
conversational participants share those sources of information the more 
they are likely to understand each other. 
In creating messages, speakers regularly take into account the other 
sources of information they expect their listeners to have, but they may 
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take account of certain elements while their listeners take readings of 
different elements or even different readings of the same elements. The 
readings taken depend, of course, on the knowledge the participants 
bring to the situation. These internal conditions further constrain possible 
representations of messages, and it is in terms of these internal condi- 
tions through which information must be “filtered” that adults and 
children may differ. Children may take readings from the same do- 
mains as adults, but what they can process and how will depend on the 
representational systems they have thus far constructed. Their abilities at 
different ages are an empirical issue, which recent work in language 
acquisition on comprehension and pragmatics has begun to address (e.g., 
Atkinson, Note 1; Bates 1976a; Bloom, 1974; Dore, 1977; Garvey, 1975; 
Huttenlocher, 1974; Keenan and Klein, 1975; Macnamaraand Baker, 1977; 
Shatz and Graves, Note 7). Yet, even unsophisticated children actively 
and continually represent to themselves the events and relationships in 
their world and take readings from a variety of sources to interpret 
messages, although their readings may be impoverished, or at least dif- 
ferent, compared to those of adults. 
While children’s readings and hence their representations may differ 
from those of their parents, the consequent misunderstandings may not 
be obvious, for children may produce responses that are appropriate both 
to their representations and to those intended by their parents. For 
example, if the child described above knew, as did the adult, that “why 
don’t you” questions can function as requests for action, and if the 
child also knew how to decode the case relationships expressed by the 
grammar of the sentence, then the appropriate response would have 
been a valid sign of understanding; but the same response could have 
been generated even if the child knew only that dolls typically go in 
swings (not vice versa) and that language is an invitation to produce some 
plausible activity on his or her part. Although the child would have 
made the same response, leading the adult to infer understanding, he or 
she would in fact have misunderstood. If parents’ most frequent messages 
to their children are just the kind that can be answered on the basis of 
such simple response strategies, then parents are likely to overestimate 
their children’s understanding. 
The Messages Directed to Young Children 
Mothers’ messages typically are expressed about equally often as de- 
claratives, questions, and imperatives (Broen, 1972; Newport, 1976; 
Snow, 1972). This does not mean, however, that parents are engaged 
equally often in getting their children to do things and in giving and asking 
for information. Sentence mood is not a wholly reliable indicator of inten- 
tion in English. For example, questions (“Can you shut the door?“) and 
274 MARILYN SHATZ 
declaratives (“The window is open.“) can both function as directives in 
the appropriate contexts. Several researchers have shown that mothers 
regularly use such indirect forms to elicit action from their children (Holz- 
man, 1972; Remick, Note 4; Shatz, 1978; Shatz, Note 6). Even the bulk 
of the complex sentences spoken to young children by both mothers and 
older children serves to direct the activities of the listener (Gelman & 
Shatz, 1977). It would seem, then, that speakers often intend their 
utterances, regardless of their form, to elicit action responses from their 
young listeners. 
There is some evidence that young children appear to understand 
“indirect directives,” sentences spoken with the intention of getting the 
listener to do something but which do not explicitly convey that intention 
syntactically. Shatz (1978) videotaped five mothers and their children, aged 
19-28 months, as they played with and talked about a toy in a natural 
conversational situation at home. The mothers’ requests for action which 
were expressed by the direct imperative form were not more likely to 
elicit action from their children than were those expressed indirectly. 
Indeed, when the children responded meaningfully at all (as opposed to 
ignoring their mothers or just looking confused), they almost always 
responded with action. 
One explanation of the children’s behavior is that they are very 
sophisticated about reading speaker intentions from the language they 
hear. Under this interpretation, they derive the literal meaning of 
an utterance from the syntax and semantics and then, when a literal 
reading seems unreasonable in the context spoken, they infer al- 
ternative interpretations, namely, that action is being requested. [Searle 
(1975) and Clark and Lucy (1975) suggest this sort of procedure for 
adults.] Given this interpretation, parents’ beliefs that their children are 
very clever at understanding what is said to them seem justified. However, 
granting children such sophisticated competence may be unwarranted. 
The Processing Heuristics of the Young Child: Joint Activity and the 
Action Procedure 
What kinds of knowledge do young children bring to the task of 
representing messages? Very young infants notice verbalizations directed 
to them, and they produce activity in return (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 
1975; Escalona, 1973). Their response behaviors such as eye contact, 
smiling, and babbling may be nothing more than preprogrammed 
acknowledgments of the existence of an animate being, but they are im- 
portant precursors to a communicative system depending on sequenced 
interactions between participants (Bruner, 1975). One of the earliest 
knowledge sources underlying an interpretive system, then, is a social one: 
knowing how to recognize that an interaction has begun, that it is 
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directed at one’s self, and that it is maintained by responding to it. Also, 
from their early months, children are busily learning, via their active 
manipulation of the world around them, the properties of objects and the 
kinds of actions that can be performed on them (Piaget, 1952). Much of 
their first representations of the world are likely to be in terms of these 
action relationships. 
These two aspects of the young child’s world, social interaction and 
action on objects, are first brought together when parent and child engage 
each other in some activity involving objects in the world, for example, 
placing a rattle in the infant’s hand and his subsequent release of it. In these 
circumstances an external object becomes the focus of joint activity and 
joint attention (Bruner, 1975). Thus, children come to expect that certain 
of their actions are somehow joined with those of their parents and that 
the choice of action is further constrained by the object under mutual 
consideration. 
During these joint activities, parents may utter the words for the objects 
acted upon and the actions performed. Children who already know that 
verbalizations are a means to creating joint attention and that words are 
often accompanied by designative gestures like pointing and showing begin 
to recognize that words act referentially,’ as designators of the objects 
to be acted upon or the actions to be performed. The function of the 
interaction is similar both for the child who has learned that words have 
a referential purpose and for the child without such knowledge: Interac- 
tions create a joint focus of activity. For the child without referential 
word knowledge, language may function solely as an attention getter; 
for the child with such knowledge, the parent’s words specify the activity 
or object over which the interaction is to take place. 
However, even for the more knowledgeable child, the heuristic of repre- 
senting messages fully in terms of objects to be acted upon and actions to 
be performed results in representations that need not include an explicit 
concept of speaker intention. Rather, the fact of an interaction including 
language of necessity involves a call for action. The simple response 
procedure (A) then follows directly from the nature of the interpretation. 
(A) Respond with action a or with an action on some object o, where a and o are 
members of the set S the elements of which consist of actions or objects 
identifiable from the speech stream. 
Thus, children are granted a system for producing responses to language 
which presupposes only minimal knowledge of any of the formal rule sys- 
’ The question of reference has a long history as a philosophical problem, and I do not 
mean to make the acquisition of a notion of reference appear to be trivial. One can, however, 
distinguish an abstract notion of reference class from reference to a particular object in 
context. It is this latter use of reference that is most obviously facilitated by joint attention 
and activity. See Bates (1976b) and Bruner (1975) for similar views on understanding 
reference in context. 
276 MARILYN SHATZ 
terns that supposedly constrain adults’ interpretations of sentences (cf. 
Grice, 1975; Katz, 1972, 1977; Searle, 1975). Their strategy is not a pro- 
cessing “short cut” used by a communicator possessing a full catalog of 
speaker intentions. It is a heuristic for dealing with a poorly understood 
source of information. Like other early strategies (Clark, 1973; 
Wilcox & Palermo, 1975), it provides a means for entering in an orderly 
way the complexity of linguistic interaction, by dealing with language in 
terms of the potential for immediate action. 
From Action Procedure to Stop-Action Procedure 
There are several ways in which the child can begin to develop a more 
diversified response system. I suggest a few here that follow from the kind 
of processing system proposed earlier. 
The simplest communicative situation in which young children find 
themselves is one in which the language directed to them refers to present 
objects or actions possible in the here and now. The physical context 
then fully supports their readings of the language. However, when children 
hear words that refer to an absent object, their action response strategy 
will still be appropriate only if the object is obtainable nearby, and they 
have the memory capacity to represent the object internally and to carry 
out a search and retrieval operation for it. Children as young as 14 months 
have been observed doing just this (Huttenlocher, 1974). However, it may 
be that the objects talked about cannot possibly be physically brought 
onto the scene. Children may hear utterances like “You look like your 
Daddy.” If Daddy is in the room, the child is likely to look at him or 
perhaps even climb up on his lap, but, if Daddy is not at home, the action 
strategy fails, providing feedback about the inadequacy of an action in- 
terpretation and response procedure. Children must then begin to search 
for a new meaning to interactions besides plausible activity. 
The experience of joint attention plus the breakdown of the action 
strategy lead to a recognition that attention can be mutually focused on the 
internal representations of an object and not just on its external embodi- 
ment. This recognition underlies the discovery that talking can refer to 
thoughts about seeing and doing (or having seen and having done) as well 
as what is being seen and done during the interaction.2 A different type of 
response is required in this sort of situation. The child still must acknowl- 
edge the interpersonal contact and give recognition of its focus. In some 
cases, symbolic actions may suffice (one can mime throwing a ball even if 
* This is not to imply that communication breakdowns necessarily lead to recognition of 
mutually held internal representations. There may be several cognitive prerequisites for the 
development of such understanding, e.g., the development of the symbolic function (Piaget, 
1962). Communication breakdowns early in the child’s interactional history may not be able 
to trigger recognition and hence may foster no growth in the response system. 
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no ball is present), or one can use words which announce that the listener 
understood what it was he or she was supposed to be thinking about. A 
repetition of the words used earlier by the speaker of the original message 
can serve this purpose as can a “yes” or a head shake. [Scollon (1977) 
provides examples of such responses.] 
Not only constraints of the physical world but also interpersonal- 
linguistic contexts provide information as to the appropriateness of action 
responding. Middle-class parents, at least, engage their children in a 
variety of language games or routines, many of which are a variation of 
the “What is this” game. [See Gleason & Weintraub (1976) on routines.] 
Again, joint attention is focused on an object, and often these routines are 
embedded in interactions requiring action. The following sequence is typi- 
cal of mothers and children in their second year: 
Mother: “Do you want a cookie?” 
(Child runs to the cookie drawer. Mother takes out a cookie and holds it 
above the child’s reach.) 
Mother: “Can you say cookie? Say cookie. What is this?” 
Child: “Cookie.” 
Mother: “That’s right. Cookie.” 
The child originally acts on the mother’s words, but the mother com- 
municates that something more is expected. The child learns that 
words like “say” and “what” function as markers signaling when he or she 
must do something besides act, namely, produce the designatory 
labels for the objects under common consideration. 
In another variation of the routine, a linguistic marker specifies the kind 
of action response required. Very young children who speak little or not 
at all have already learned that “Where is the -?” takes a showing 
response like pointing or holding out (Fraser, Bellugi, & Brown, 
1963; Huttenlocher, 1974). 
These examples suggest that response procedure (A) applies unless there 
is some element in one of the contexts that implies otherwise. As children 
get feedback on their behavior and become more adept at reading the con- 
texts, they learn when not to perform action or when action alone will not 
suffice. More formally, then, let S, as before, be the set of actions or objects 
identifiable from the speech stream, and now let L be the set of constraint 
markers identifiable from a reading of linguistic input, and C, the set of 
constraint markers identifiable from readings of the physical, inter- 
personal, or social context. Procedure (A) can now be amended to include 
the notion of stop-action markers. 
(B) Respond with action a or with action on an object o unless I or c is present, 
where a and o are members of the set S. I is a member of the set L, and c is a 
member of the set C. 
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When very young, children can identify few of these markers, but, as they 
learn them, they gradually organize them under new response procedures 
which result in an ability to disassociate messages from the performance 
of immediately possible action. The proposed response procedure ac- 
counts for children’s behavior and grants them little in the way of 
sophisticated knowledge. Need we grant young children more? The 
experiments which follow are addressed to just this question. 
Before proceeding, a word on experimental strategy is in order. The 
postulated system describes a child who starts out responding to language 
by performing immediately possible actions and who gradually learns stop- 
action markers and develops a more elaborate response system. For 
children who recognize language only as a call to attention, possible 
actions may be merely turning toward the speaker or some sort of un- 
directed motor activity. By the time children know the names of some 
objects, they may already have learned some stop-action markers or at 
least some markers for specific actions, like where mentioned earlier. 
Thus, it would be difficult to find and test children who have learned 
virtually nothing about stop-action markers. The alternative is to look at 
the developing system and to infer the nature of the earliest stages from 
the course of development. This is the sort of enterprise engaged in below. 
The children who served as subjects in these studies had response 
systems more elaborate than the postulated one. The intention was not 
to describe fully those more elaborate systems, but to discover from the 
way the children used them in a variety of circumstances what their ori- 
gins might have been and how they might have become what they were. 
EXPERIMENT I: RESPONSES TO LANGUAGE UNDER 
“NEUTRAL” CONDITIONS 
Sentences which can be interpreted as requests for action or as requests 
for or statements of information were directed to children by the 
experimenter who was neutral with regard to the interpretation she ex- 
pected her listeners to place on the utterances. The utterances were spoken 
in a context which, as nearly as possible, made neither interpretation more 
plausible than the other. Of course, a truly neutral context was unlikely 
since exactly what contextual elements might contribute to a particular 
listener’s interpretation were unknown. The obvious biases were elimi- 
nated by using a speaker other than the child’s mother and giving a varied 
set of utterances in the presence of toys that could be acted on. The experi- 
menter also tried to avoid intonations or nonverbal behavior which would 
support one interpretation over another. A listener knowing that these 
sorts of utterances can convey either directive or informational intentions 
and bringing no response bias to such a neutral situation should randomly 
select one of the two responses befitting either of the possible interpreta- 
tions. In contrast, the proposed theory generates the following predictions. 
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(a) Young children will produce a preponderance of action responses even 
though the intentions of the speaker are neutral with regard to how the 
listener is to take the sentence. 
(b) Action responses will predominate over nonaction responses for all types of 
sentences that can convey a directive reading, regardless of whether they do so 
directly or indirectly. The tendency to produce action responses should not 
differ with sentence type. 
(c) The direction of response development in neutral contexts will be away from 
action responding and toward an increased use of responses based on informa- 
tional interpretations. Thus, the younger (or less sophisticated) the child the 
more action responses produced, relative to the total production of meaningful 
responses. 
(d) The movement away from action responses is not necessarily produced by 
the acquisition of a unique set of linguistic elements marking speaker 
intentions. 
The purpose of the first experiment was to test these four predictions 
by directing a variety of utterances to children with varying degrees of 
language ability in as neutral a context as possible. 
Met hod 
Design. Children were assigned to one of three language sophistication groups (low, 
middle, or high) on the basis of their productive language ability as measured by their 
mean length of utterance (MLU) in words. 
Each subject was required to respond to eight different types of sentences. The full 
protocol consisted of five trials of each sentence type for a total of 40 test sentences. The 
trials for a particular sentence type differed from one another only with regard to the 
lexical items which related the sentence to the set of toys the child was playing with at 
the moment. The sentences were presented in five blocks of eight sentences each, consisting 
of one trial for each of the eight sentence types. Each of the five blocks utilized a single 
set of lexical items which referred to one of the five sets of toys presented one at a time 
to the child. The design is summarized in Table I. The order of sentence types within each 
TABLE I 
DESIGN FOR THE NEUTRAL CONTEXT EXPERIMENT 
Lexical item 
Sentence type 




Put (W) PIIt (go) 
Man/plane Chair/house TIi& 
I. Imperative 
2. “Can .,’ you 
3. “Whydon’tyou 
4. “Doyouwantto, 
5. “Can” + “0”” 
6. “Does” + noun 
7. Declarative 
8. “May you” 
Blocks 










I 40 sentences 
in all 
m “Go” was the verb used with Types 5, 6, and 7 
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block was varied and the order of presentation of toys and related blocks of sentences 
was randomized across children. [See Shatz, (Note 5) for further details.] 
Subjects. The subjects were I I female and 7 male middle-class children aged 19-34 months, 
with a mean age of 27 months. They were recruited on an individual basis through 
acquaintances of the experimenter. 
Toys. Each of the five sets of toys included several instances of each object, for example, 
four trucks and five balls of varying shapes and sizes for one set. The toys were selected 
to represent words young children are most likely to comprehend (Goldin-Meadow, 
Sehgman, & Gelman, 1976). 
Sentences. The eight sentence types were selected to assess the children’s responses to 
sentences that differ with regard to syntactic construction, the nature of the conditions under 
which they are interpreted as requests for action, and the general likelihood of their 
being interpreted as such by adults. The sentence types 2 through 7 listed in 
Table 1 can function as “indirect directives” in English. While their mood does not 
directly specify directive intent, they embody a variety of different conditions that can be 
questioned or emphasized in order to convey it (cf. Gordon and Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1970; 
1975). The general notion behind the Searle approach is that speaker and listener share 
knowledge about both the topic at hand and each other. When a sentence is uttered which 
directly asks a question or states something already known, that utterance cannot be intended 
literally since a speaker cannot appropriately request information he or she already has or 
give information already known (&ice, 1975). Furthermore, in a context in which the act 
specified in the proposition is yet to be done and it is likely that the speaker wants it done, 
the listener infers that the speaker intends a request for action. Thus, type 2 questions the 
listener’s abtlity to perform the act; type 3, the reason for not doing it; type 4, the listener’s 
desire to do it; type 5, the possibility of the act being done; type 6, the truth of the proposition; 
and type 7 asserts the truth of the proposition. Sentence types 1 and 8 are controls in that type 
I is the imperative which directly expresses the directive intent and type 8 is a question 
form similar in syntax to type 2 (inverted modal + you) which rarely functions as an indirect 
directive in English. 
The variety of these sentence types allowed for the testing of the hypothesis that different 
conditions for creating directives are learned at different times as well as for the testing of 
hypotheses about the children’s use of surface markers like “you” as cues to responding. 
Procedure. During an initial “get-acquainted” session in the subject’s home, the child’s 
speech was tape-recorded in order to obtain a corpus on which to compute an MLU. A 
simple comprehension test (cf. Huttenlocher, 1974) was administered to determine whether 
the children knew the names of the toys to be used in the later session. Only the youngest 
child failed several items and was later shown only three sets of toys. 
Within a week, the experimenter returned to the subject’s home and, after a short warm-up 
play session between mother and child, began the experiment by giving the child the first 
of five bags containing a set of toys and speaking the sentences associated with that toy. The 
test sentences were interspersed among filler sentences that typically commented on features 
of the toys or some irrelevant behavior of the child. At least two filler sentences separated 
any two different test sentences. The experimenter tried to utter the test sentences at times 
when the child’s attention seemed focused on the play situation, but, if the child was just 
about to touch the toys or had already begun to perform an action like the one in the 
test sentence, the experimenter delayed uttering the sentence. If the child did not respond 
to the first instance ofa test sentence, then it was repeated once. Particularly with the younger 
children, two attention-getting devices were occasionally used: calling the child’s name and 
placing toys in the child’s line of sight before the utterance was spoken. The experimenter 
also tried to minimize nonverbal cues like pointing at the toys and reinforcement of specific 
responses. General reinforcements like “You’re a good boy!” wer: interspersed throughout 
the session. If a child became inattentive or uncooperative with one set of toys, a new bag 
was brought out even though a block of sentences had not been completed. Thus, the mean 
number of sentences heard was 35 with a range from 17 to 40. The standard time for an 
experimental session was about 30 min. 
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Equipment. Tape recordings were made using a Sony 180 portable tape recorder and an 
EKG D 109 microphone. The experimental sessions were videotaped using a Sony AV 3600 
videorecorder, an EKG D 109 microphone, and a Concord CTC 33 camera equipped with a 
zoom lens. 
Data Analysis 
Co~nputrrtion of MLU. The audiotapes of the children’s speech were transcribed by the 
author and a mean length of utterance in words was computed for each child according 
to the procedure in Shatr and Gelman (1973). The children were then assigned to one of three 
groups depending upon their MLU. The low group of six children had a mean MLU of I .4 
and a range from 1 to I .8 words per utterance. The six children in the middle group had a 
mean MLU of 2.4 and a range from 2 to 2.7 words. The six in the high group had a mean 
MLU of 3.5 with a range from 3.2 to 4.0. 
Coding of responses. Table 2 summarizes the categories of children’s responses to test 
sentences. There were three basic kinds of categories of responses: meaningful responses 
where the children produced some behavior (verbal or nonverbal) that indicated relatively 
unambiguously the minimal meaning they had to have extracted from the message in order to 
have considered producing that response: umhi,guous responses where the children’s be- 
havior indicated that they had heard and had responded to the utterance but it could not be 
determined with enough confidence how they had interpreted it; and finally indeterminufe 
behaviors that were responses only in the sense that they described what the children were 
doing (or not doing) after the utterance occurred, but it could not be determined whether 
these behaviors were contingent on the speaking of the utterance. The scoring took ac- 
count of both the child’s verbal and nonverbal behavior as well as the temporal relationship 
between the two. Thus, for any given category, both kinds of behavior had to support the 
assignment of the combined response behaviors to that category. 
The two subcategories of meaningful responses, action and informing, are the most im- 
portant for our concerns here. For action responses, the minimal assumption of meaningful- 
ness is that children see speech as signals for action on the objects made salient by the 
linguistic mcssagc itself or perhaps by prior activity. There is no assumption that children 
have a notion of speaker intention, only that they recognize the need to respond to speech 
with some activity. Informing responses assume that children have learned (a) that speech 
can be an invitation to direct their attention (and not necessarily actions) to some external 
object or event or (b) that speech can focus joint attention on internal representations as 
well as external objects and activities. Thus, action responses are not necessarily responses 
of activity without any verbalizations. nor are informing responses necessarily any verbaliza- 
tion without accompanying action. The names assigned to these two categories refer to the 
nature of the children’s interpretations that can be inferred from their response patterns and 
not directly to the nature of the responses themselves. 
In addition to the criterion that the child had to perform or begin to perform the ac- 
tion requested. two further criteria had to be fulfilled before a response was counted as ac. 
tion. First, the child had to appear to do the action in response to the utterance 
and not appear to be about to do it anyway. Second, what the child said in ac- 
companiment to his or her action could not suggest anything other than that he or she had 
taken the utterance as a call to action. For example. children were credited with action 
responses if they answered “Can you put the ball in the truck?” with a “yes” and then 
proceeded to do the action. The decision to count this pattern as action responding was 
based on its similarity to the “okay” followed by action pattern that the children often pro- 
duced.:’ However, if they did the action and then said something like, “See, it fits,” then 
they were considered to have done the action only to test out or show its feasibility and 
were credited with informing responses. Likewise, action followed by “yes” was also 
:j It is possible that achild learns that some types of sentences take a “yes” response as an 
accompaniment to action responses before learning that such sentences also can have 
informational interpretations (cf. Shatz, 1978.) 
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TABLE 2 
CATEGORIES FOR CODING CHILDREN’S RESPONSES IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 












Action apparently in response to and appropriate to direc- 
tive interpretation, at least with regard to form (even if 
not a completed action on the correct referent). Any ac- 
companying verbalization to be consonant with action 
categorization and not suggestive of alternative inter- 
pretation. 
(a) Verbal responses appropriate to the syntax of the 
speaker’s utterance and unaccompanied by action. (b) 
Verbal responses accompanied by or following action 
when verbalizations report on tests of the feasibility of 
action. (c)Attentive looking in response to declaratives. 
(a) Verbal “no” without any attempt at action. (b) Non- 
verbal refusal: turning away, throwing toys, etc. 
Inconsistencies between verbal and nonverbal behavior, 
e.g., a verbal “no” accompanied by attempted action. 
Verbalization requesting a repetition of or more informa- 
tion about the action specified in speaker’s utterance 
without accompanying action. 
No evidence, either verbal or nonverbal, that speaker’s 
utterance was processed or even heard. 
Looking blankly at speaker, possible handling of toys, but 
no evidence of arrival at an interpretation or response 
to speaker’s utterance. 
(a) Verbalizations unintelligible, actions unclear. (b) Action 
accomplished but may have been begun independently 
before speaker’s utterance. (c) Action accomplished but 
possibly unduly influenced by speaker’s nonverbal be- 
havior. 
counted as informing since again there was the possibility that the action had been performed 
as a test of feasibility. Of course, relevant verbalizations unaccompanied by relevant action 
responses were counted as informing responses as were instances of attentive looking in 
response to declaratives.4 
Not all the verbalizations the children produced were relevant to the categorization judg- 
ments. Some seemed to occur just as accompaniments to the actions the children performed 
and may even have aided their performance (Luria, 1964; Piaget, 1926). For example, in 
response to “Why don’t you put the man on the plane?” one child did the action 
and said, “Go in there” as she did so. The children also sometimes asked questions such as 
“This one?” or “In here?” to confirm their already-begun action responses or the objects 
to be acted on. Such verbalizations typically did not influence categorization decisions. [See 
Shatz (Note 5) for further details on coding.] 
I The attentive looks were qualitatively different from the uncomprehending stares counted 
as “looking” under indeterminate behaviors (see Table 2). 
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Coder reliability. All of the responses were initially coded from the videotapes by a re- 
search assistant. The author separately coded 10 randomly selected tapes, and per- 
centage agreement scores were computed. The overall percentage agreement was 88% 
with a range from 76 to 100%. All the tapes were then rechecked and disagreements were 
discussed and resolved. 
Measures. The categorized responses were used to compute two measures for each child 
for each sentence type. The first measure is the proportion of all possible codings (including 
indeterminate responses) which were action (A) responses. Thus, an A/T (for Total) score of 
80% for a child who was presented with five trials of a sentence type indicates that he or 
she responded with action four times out of five. The second measure is a proportion of only 
the meaningful (M) responses: the proportion of action and informing responses that were 
action responses. Thus, an A/M score of 100% for the above subject would indicate that on 
the five trials he or- she had responded four times with action and had not responded the 
fifth time with an informing response, whereas an A/M score of 80% would indicate that the 
nonaction response had been an informing response. 
Results and Preliminary Discussion 
The Predominance of Action Responding 
The first prediction stated that young children would produce a pre- 
ponderance of action responses even in the “neutral” context. Across all 
sentence types, for just the action and informing responses, an average of 
91% of them were action and only 9% were informing. For each of the 18 
subjects, at least 75% of the action and informing responses were action 
responses. Not only did action responses predominate over informing re- 
sponses, they predominated over all other behaviors. The average per- 
centage of action responses over total responses was 62%. Fourteen of 
eighteen children produced action responses to more than half of all the 
utterances they heard. Sixteen percent of all the action responses were of 
the “yes” followed by action type. Even if all these responses had been 
coded as informing instead of action, the bias for action responding would 
still have appeared. 
The Effect of Sentence Type 
The second prediction stated that all types of sentences should elicit a 
high proportion of action and that the amount of action elicited should be 
independent of the particular type of test sentence. The first column of 
Table 3 shows that more than half the responses elicited by each sentence 
type were action responses. Neither a Friedman two-way analysis of 
variance on the rankings of the A/T scores [Xr2 (7) = 6.36, p < .4] or 
individual t tests testing the mean A/T score for each sentence type against 
the grand mean revealed any significant difference among sentence 
types. Thus, on the basis of the A/T measure, no one sentence type regu- 
larly elicited more action behaviors than did the other types. 
The second column of Table 3 shows that, for each of the eight sentence 
types, the proportion of action responses to meaningful responses was at 
least 80%. Only one child in the high-MLU group produced more informing 
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responses than action responses for one sentence type (“Can you . . .“). 
Thus, each sentence type elicited a preponderance of action responses 
over informing responses for virtually all the children. Moreover, a Fried- 
man two-way analysis of variance on the rankings of the AIM scores 
showed no significant differences among sentence types [X,’ (7) = 11.37, 
p < .2]. 
Development Away from Action Responding 
The third prediction was that the direction of response development 
would be away from a high proportion of action responses toward an 
increase in informing responses. The mean A/M scores were 98, 93, and 
83% for the low-, middle-, and high-MLU groups, respectively. There was 
little overlap of scores among the groups, and the probability of obtaining 
that distribution of scores is less than ,001 (Kruskal- Wallis N (2) = 20.10). 
Furthermore, two subjects in the low-MLU group produced only four 
informing responses out of a total of 194 responses; five subjects in the 
middle group contributed 11 informing responses out of 220; and in the 
high group six subjects produced 28 out of 224. The predicted result was 
obtained despite the fact that easily producible responses like looking at- 
tentive to a declarative orjust nodding one’s head “yes” were both allowed 
as informing responses. 
Patterns of Response Development 
The last prediction was that there is no unique set of markers that is 
acquired in an orderly fashion which determines the movement toward in- 
forming responses. It was noted earlier that only one child, for one sen- 
tence type, produced more informing responses than action responses. 
Thus, the hypothesis that the young child’s responses are controlled by the 
TABLE 3 




total responses meaningful responses 
Imperative 70 100 
“Can .” you 59 90 
“Whydon’tyou . . .” 65 100 
“Do want to you .” 64 94 
“Can” + noun 58 83 
“Does” + noun 55 85 
Declarative 59 88 
“May you . .” 62 87 
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mood of the input sentences is discredited by the fact that imperatives, 
interrogatives, and declaratives all received many action responses from 
all the subjects. Nevertheless, one can ask whether there are other 
markers which might encourage a child to deviate from the procedure of 
action responding. A variety of hypotheses concerning the kinds of linguis- 
tic markers that might function as such “action inhibitors” were examined 
both within subjects and within groups. 
If a child assumes that utterances with rising intonation may require an 
informing response, then, in a relatively neutral context, each of the ques- 
tion types should elicit an informing response at least once. None of the 
children followed such a pattern of producing at least one informing re- 
sponse to each of the question types. Even excluding “Why don’t 
you . . . ,” which one can argue is rarely meant literally and may be 
learned as an idiomatic imperative, one finds no evidence for the intona- 
tional cue hypothesis. 
Another possibility is that the absence of “you” acted as a stop-action 
cue in sentences not having an action word in the initial position. This 
possibility is discounted for the younger groups because they pro- 
duced no informing responses to the declarative. For the high group, three 
children produced at least one informing response to each of the three 
sentence types not containing “you,” but each also gave one informing 
response to a sentence containing “you.” Therefore, the “absence of you” 
cue cannot fully account for their behavior. 
Alternatively, children may notice that the declarative is a type of sen- 
tence which often requires no overt response on their part except atten- 
tion to the objects or activities referred to in the speech they hear. None 
of the children in the two younger groups produced any such behavior in 
response to the declarative, but five of the children in the high group did 
SO once, and one did so twice. Table 4 illustrates that for no other sen- 
TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF SUBJKTS IN EACH GROUP WHO GAVE AT LEAST ONE INFORMING 
RMPONSE TO A SENTENCE. TYPE, EXPERIMENT I 
MLU group 
Sentence type Low Middle High 
Imperative 
“Can you .” 
“Why don’t you .’ 
“Do you want to 
“Can” + ncmn 
“Does” + noun 
Declarative 
“May you .” 
0 0 0 
1 I I 
0 0 0 
0 I 3 
I 2 5 
I 2 4 
0 0 6 
I 2 3 
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tence type did every subject in a group produce at least one informing 
response. Here, then, is some evidence that children who can put together 
fairly complete sentences may be growing more sensitive to the gram- 
matical features of sentences as clues to appropriate responding.5 
Nevertheless, in a situation where contextual cues had been minimized 
and the surface features of the sentences could have been considered the 
best guide to the required response, the children’s response patterns indi- 
cated little overall sensitivity to general syntactic differences among the 
sentences. Instead, children may gradually learn that in certain contexts 
some sentences are not appropriately answered by action, and they learn 
this by occasionally hearing those sentences in just such situations. In 
fact, the two sentence types which elicited no informing responses at all, 
the imperative and the “Why don’t you,” are just the ones children 
would most likely hear only in directive contexts. Apparently, children 
need not learn which sentences require action responses, since they all do 
at the earliest stages; and those for which the children receive no counter 
evidence simply continue to do so. The final prediction receives support in 
that no unique set of linguistic markers examined seems to be the source 
of that counter evidence. 
Summary 
The results of this first experiment have shown that, even in a neutral 
situation, children produce a preponderance of action responses to a 
variety of sentence types, some of which are typically considered to be 
requests for action only rarely (e.g., “May you . . . “). Moreover, sen- 
tence types differ little with regard to the likelihood they will elicit action 
responses. The more sophisticated the children in terms of their productive 
language capacity, the more likely they are to produce an occasional in- 
forming response, but there is no apparent unique set of linguistic markers 
that will lead children to produce informing as opposed to action responses 
in this neutral situation. These results, together with those of Shatz (1978), 
suggest that young children come to the communicative situation strongly 
biased to respond to language with action. The next experiment explores 
the nature of this bias and tests the strength of it in different contexts. 
EXPERIMENT II: THE EFFECTS OF CONTEXTUAL SET 
Sentences that can be taken in more than one way were presented in two 
different contexts, one supporting a directive interpretation and one sup- 
s Of course, with the data at hand, one cannot determine the relative utility of several 
possible cues. Some children may have noted that sentences with initial-position fhe often 
do not require action, whereas others may have focused on intonation differences. More- 
over, since most of the high-group children also produced occasional informing responses to 
other sentence types, factors additional to those peculiar to declarative forms are necessary 
to account for the data in Table 4. 
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porting an informational interpretation. While the two contexts supported 
different interpretations, neither one completely prohibited action or in- 
forming responses. Subjects were presented with the same or equivalent 
test sentence twice, but each time the test sentence was preceded by 
different “setting” sentences, to which subjects were expected to have 
responded differentially. 
From the model presented earlier, several predictions were made about 
young children’s response behavior in these circumstances. 
(a) For those children who have given evidence of the ability to produce an 
informing response, the tendency to produce such responses increases in 
contexts supporting them. 
(b) While an informational context enhances the tendency to produce informing 
responses, children are still less likely to produce informing responses in an 
informational context than they are action responses in a directive context, 
given sentences that can be taken in more than one way. 
(c) The direction of development is toward a greater influence of context on 
responses to sentences that can be taken in more than one way. That is, the 
more sophisticated children are more likely to produce informing responses in 
the appropriate context than are the less sophisticated children. 
Obviously, at some very early stage young children are incapable of 
making informing responses, but the proposed model predicts that even 
children who can produce such responses do so only under very limited 
circumstances: When they are stopped from responding with action either 
by physical, social, or interpersonal constraints or by virtue of having 
learned a linguistic routine in which an alternative reply is required. Hy- 
pothesis (c) follows not from the assumption that more sophisticated 
children will have an easier time producing informing responses, but from 
the notion that they will have learned more about the social or 
linguistic environments requiring them. Given the low requirements for 
producing an informing response, it is unlikely that a response difficulty 
hypothesis could account for the predominance of action responding. 
Nevertheless, the question was investigated further by examining the 
frequency of informing responses to the relatively unambiguous setting 
sentences. Thus, the experiment tested both the response difficulty 
hypothesis as well as hypotheses (a)-(c). 
Met hod 
Design. A subset of sentence types used in the first experiment was used to generate a 
list of test sentences: (1) “Can you ,” (2) “Can” + noun , (3) the declarative, 
and (4) “Why don’t you. .“. The test sentences were preceded by either three or four 
direct imperatives to foster a directive interpretation or three or four informational ques- 
tions or statements to foster an informational interpretation. The combination of a series 
of setting sentences plus a test sentence was called a sequence. Thus, there were directive 
sequences and informational sequences. The setting sentences chosen for informational 
sequences either referred to actions that were not possible in the physical context (“Can 
Daddy talk on the telephone?” when the father was absent) or referred to properties of 
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TABLE 5 
EXAMPLES OF DIRECTIVE AND INFORMATIONAL SEQUENCES 
IN THE CONTEXTUAL SET EXPERIMENT 
Directive sequence Informational sequence 
Introductory Who talks on the telephone 
in your house? 
Setting sentences Come get the telephone. Can Mommy talk on the 
telephone? 
Push the button. Can Daddy talk on the 
telephone? 
Find the “one.” Can (sibling or pet) talk on 
Ring the bell. the telephone? 
Can a dolly talk on the 
telephone? 
Identical test sentence Can you talk on the 
telephone? 
Can you talk on the 
telephone? 
Introductory Let’s play a game. 
Setting sentences Touch your nose. Is this an apple?” 
Clap your hands. What is this? 
Show me your tongue. Is this fruit? 
Stand up. Is this yellow? 
Nonidentical test sentences Can you jump? Can you eat this apple? 
Cl Toy was a plastic apple with other “fruits” nested inside it. 
objects with no mention of action (“Is this red?“). The setting imperatives, of course, all 
explicitly requested action. 
Three of the four test sentence types appeared in both directive and informational 
sequences. “Why don’t you .” appeared just in two informational sequences. That type 
was the only indirect directive in the earlier experiment that had elicited no informing 
responses at all. It was included here to see whether informing responses to it could be 
elicited in supportive situations or whether children would show no ability to produce even 
“because” as a response.6 Since the other sentence types had elicited informing responses, 
the “Why don’t you . . .” sentences were treated separately so as not to confound the 
question of response difficulty with the effect of context. 
For the other three sentence types, there were six trials each, half in each type of 
sequence, for a total of 18 sequences. Within sequence types, each trial of a given sentence 
type utilized different setting sentences, content words in the test sentence, and accompany- 
ing toys. Across sequence types, each trial of a given sentence type differed on setting 
sentences but not necessarily on toys or content words. Table 5 illustrates identical test 
sentences that occurred in both types of sequence and nonidentical sentences that occurred 
in only one. Two sets of the “Can you .” and “Can” + noun . . sequences and one 
ofthe declaratives utilized identical sentences. Also illustrated in Table 5 are “introductory” 
sentences which were used occasionally to help set the scene and assure the non- 
ambiguity of the setting sentences. 
6 Ervin-Tripp (1970) found that 2-year-olds interpreted “Why don’t you .” as a call 
to action, “and if there was no way to perform the response, they did not reply.” 
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Subjects were assigned to one of two language sophistication groups on the basis of their 
productive language ability. All subjects heard all 18 sequences. The subjects almost always 
had some toy to which the sentences referred and which they could manipulate. (The 
lone exception is the jump sequence in Table 5.) A single order for presentation of 
sequences was devised which sought to maintain the child’s interest and the 
naturalness of the situation while mingling the two kinds of sequences throughout. [See 
Shatz (Note 5) for details.] 
Subjects. The subjects were I3 of the children who had participated in the neutral condi- 
tion experiment. The five children who had given no informing responses at all in Experiment 
1 were not included since the likelihood of getting sufficient appropriate responses from 
them on the setting sentences seemed small. The remaining children were divided into two 
groups on the basis of the language samples collected earlier: one of seven children with 
MLU values of less than three words per utterance (mean MLU = 2.1) and the other of 
six children with MLU values of more than three words per utterance (mean MLU = 3.5). 
Toys. The toys were commercially available small toys and picture books appropriate 
for young preschoolers. 
Procedure. Within a week after the child had participated in the first experiment, the second 
experiment was videotaped in the subject’s home. The experimenter invited the subject to 
join her on the floor together with a large bag containing I2 envelopes, each with a toy or set of 
toys in it. The experimenter presented the toys from one envelope at a time to the child, who 
was given a few minutes to manipulate the toys before the experimenter uttered the initial 
sentence of the first sequence related to those toys.’ 
The experimenter followed introductory sentences immediately with the first setting sen- 
tence without allowing for a response. After each setting sentence, the subject was given 
an opportunity to respond. but one setting sentence followed fairly quickly upon the last. If 
the child’s attention wandered, or the play session was interrupted, the experimenter at- 
tempted to give the subject the same total number of setting sentences as he or she would 
have had without interruption. The experimenter spoke no other sentences once a sequence 
was begun except for occasional words of reinforcement or short replies to the child’s 
comments, nor did she challenge or question responses. Setting sentences not responded 
to were repeated once. 
The experimenter used several nonverbal and parasyntactic devices to facilitate the in- 
tended interpretations of the setting sentences. For example, for an informational sequence 
on dolls fitting in swings, the experimenter picked up and showed each doll to the subject 
as she spoke, shaking her head in appropriate ways while uttering sentences like “It can 
fit in the swing” or “This doll can’t fit in the swing.” For imperatives, the experimenter 
might point to the referent. Also, the setting sentences were spoken in as natural a manner as 
possible with the intention and intonation appropriate to the type of sequence. 
The test sentence followed immediately upon the child’s response to the last setting sentence 
of a sequence. It was spoken with the intonation appropriate to the intention, but nonverbal 
cues were avoided. A test sentence receiving no response was repeated once, 
When the child had responded to the last test sentence relating to particular toys, the 
experimenter would pull out another envelope and begin a new sequence. If a child became 
uncooperative, particular toys or sequences would be eliminated. The average number of 
sequences presented per child was 17, out of a possible 18 (excluding the two “Why don’t 
you .” sequences). Approximately 40 min were required to present the entire protocol. 
’ Occasionally, during this time, the child did just the activity relevant to the sequence. 
If this happened, the subject completed the activity, and the experimenter then placed the 
toys where she wanted them and began the sequence. Thus, it is likely that later actions 
were actually responses to test sentences and not just actions a more restrictive procedure 
might have prohibited earlier. 
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Data Analysis 
The children’s responses to both the setting sentences and the test sentences were coded 
according to the categories described earlier. Scores on the following measures were then 
computed for each subject: (1) for setting sentences, the proportion of all responses to 
directive setting sentences that were action responses and the proportion of all responses to 
informational setting sentences that were informing responses (i.e., the proportion for each 
kind of setting sentence that was answered “appropriately”); (2) for each type of sequence, 
the proportion of sequences “passed,” that is, the percentage in which the subjects had 
responded appropriately, as in 1, to three out of four or two out of three of the setting 
sentences; and (3) for the test sentences, the A/T and A/M measures described 
earlier were again used, but these utilized only the responses to test sentences occurring in 
passed sequences, where subjects could be considered to have been “set” to respond in 
one way or another. An I/T score, the percentage of total responses that were informing 
responses, was similarly calculated. 
The reliability of code assignment was checked as before by having two coders 
independently code some of the transcripts. The agreement between coders on eight ran- 
domly selected transcripts was 82%. Disagreements were discussed and resolved. 
Results and Preliminary Discussion 
The “Can you . . .,” “Can” + noun . . . , and Declarative Sequences 
Setting sentences. The responses to the setting sentences revealed that 
even the less competent speakers had little difficulty producing both kinds 
of responses when called for. The more sophisticated group responded 
with action 88% of the time to imperatives, whereas the less sophisticated 
group did so 84% of the time. In response to unambiguous informational 
sentences, the higher group produced 85% informing responses, the lower 
group, 82%. Neither the between-group or within-group differences were 
significant. Thus, children producing at least one but never very many in- 
forming responses in the neutral context of the first experiment had no 
difficulty producing those responses abundantly in situations in which both 
sentence and nonverbal context clearly called for them. At least for 
children with this amount of productive ability, the strong tendency 
to action responding found earlier is not attributable to an informing 
response deficiency. 
Not surprisingly there was also no difference between groups with 
regard to scores for passing sequences of either kind. Table 6 summarizes 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF SEQUENCES PASSED, EXPERIMENT 2 
Type of sequence 
MLU group Directive Informational 
Less than three words 92 81 
More than three words 93 85 
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the scores. While the between- and within-group differences were not 
significant, there was some tendency overall for the children to pass more 
directive sequences than informational ones [t(l2) = 1.86, p < . lo]. 
Test sentences. The t tests on the likelihood of responding with action 
to nonidentical versus identical test sentences for each of the two kinds of 
sequences showed no differences between identicals and nonidenticals, 
nor was there any evidence that the first response to an identical sentence 
influenced the nature of the response to the second occurrence of that 
sentence. Therefore, the data on nonidentical and identical sentences were 
combined for the remaining analyses. 
Only five children produced one informing response each in answer to 
all the test sentences in directive sequences. The remaining eight children 
produced none. In contrast, every child produced at least one informing 
response to the test sentences in informational sequences. Table 7 shows 
that for the combined groups the average proportion of I/T responses in 
the informing sequences was 46%. Thus, the first prediction is confirmed 
in that an informational context enhanced the production of informing 
responses. 
It can be seen in Table 7 that the children produced a higher proportion 
of action responses in the directive sequences (68%) than informing re- 
sponses in the informational sequences (46%) [r(12) = 2.98, p < .Ol, one 
tailed]. Moreover, an action response “error” was much more likely to 
occur in an informational sequence (3 1%) than was an informing response 
“error” in a directive sequence (5%). These results are just the ones 
predicted for listeners whose primary mode of responding is action and 
who have to be detoured from it by specific cues. 
The final prediction concerned the direction of development away from 
action and toward informing responding in the informational context. 
Table 7 also shows the proportion of meaningful responses that were action 
responses for the two kinds of sequences for the two groups of children. 
TABLE 7 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF ACTION AND INFORMING RESPONSES 
TO TEST SENTENCES, EXPERIMENT 2 
Type of sequence 
Measure” Directive Informational 
Action/total 68 31 
Informing/total 5 46 
Actionimeaningful 
Less than three words group 90 53 
More than three words group 94 28 
a MLU groups are combined for the A/T and I/T measures. 
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While the groups did not differ on the directive sequences, the more ad- 
vanced children produced fewer action responses (28%) on the informa- 
tional sequences than did the less sophisticated children (53%) (Mann- 
Whitney U = 2, p < .Ol). As predicted, the more sophisticated children 
were influenced more by the nature of the preceding conversation. 
Again, the “yes” + action responses were counted to check on possible 
effects of the coding scheme. In the directive set 18% of the action 
responses were of this type, and in the informational set 17% were. Since 
the more sophisticated children produced twice as many of these re- 
sponses as did the less sophisticated group, the developmental trends 
already shown would have been stronger still under a coding scheme count- 
ing “yes” + action as an informing response. 
Had the more sophisticated listeners acquired some syntactic knowledge 
that fostered informing responses in the informational set? Table 8 shows 
that on the average the more sophisticated group produced fewer action 
responses (and hence more informing responses) than the less sophisti- 
cated group for each of the sentence types. However, only the difference 
for “Can you . . .” is significant by a Mann-Whitney test (U = 2, 
p < .Ol). The within-group differences between types are not significant. 
An analysis of responses by sequence for each of the two kinds of 
sequence revealed no significant effect of particular sequence on re- 
sponses. Thus, while on the whole the children were not terribly con- 
sistent in the way they responded to one type of sentence versus another, 
or one sequence versus another, there was a tendency for the lower 
group to respond more with action to the “Can you . . .” sentences and 
for the higher group to give informing responses to them. Possibly the 
presence ofyou encouraged poor speakers to respond with action but adept 
speakers were more influenced by previous conversation. In any case, 
again the influence of mood was minimal, nor did any obvious set of surface 
linguistic features account for the observed response patterns. 
Finally, it is unlikely that the observed differences in response patterns 
for directive versus informational sequences are due solely to differences 
in the intonation with which test sentences were spoken in the two kinds 
TABLE 8 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF MEANINGFUL RESPONSES TO THREE SENTENCE TYPES 
IN INFORMATIONAL SEQUENCES THAT WERE ACTION RESPONSES, EXPERIMENT 2 
Type of sentence 
MLU group “Can you” “Can” + noun Declarative 
Less than three words 83 45 45 
More than three words 13 25 39 
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of sequence. In an experiment on intonation (Shatz, Note 5), adult sub- 
jects heard apart from context only the test sentences, which had been 
transferred to audiotape from the videotapes. They could not determine at a 
level significantly greater than chance which utterances had been intended 
as directives and which as informationals. Thus, it is improbable that the 
children in the contextual set experiment used only the parasyntactic 
information available in the test sentences when selecting their responses. 
It is possible, however, that the maintenance of intonation or stress pat- 
terns from setting to test sentence encouraged some children to rely on 
prior conversation in constructing an interpretation. 
“Why don’t you . . .” Sequences 
The first of the two informational “Why don’t you . . .” sequences 
included declarative setting sentences to which the children simply had to 
attend. The test sentence, “Why don’t you jump rope?” was said in 
the absence of a jumprope, in order to help foster the informational 
interpretation.8 All 11 subjects who heard this sequence passed the setting 
sentences, but the two MLU groups’ responses to the test sentence were 
quite different. Two of the five less adept speakers literally jumped in 
response to the sentence; the other three said “no” or did nothing. Only 
one subject in the higher group gave such a response. Four others answered 
by providing reasons for not doing the action, e.g., “I don’t have 
rope.” One corrected the experimenter by saying, “I cm jump!” None of 
the children used the word because in their responses. 
The second of these sequences utilized “Why don’t you . . .” sen- 
tences for both setting and test sentences. The setting sentences were 
“defective” as requests for action in that the acts requested were not 
feasible (cf. Searle, 1975), and hence the only reasonable interpretation 
was informational. Surprisingly, half of the children attempted the actions 
proposed in the setting sentences. They would put their feet to their 
ears in response to “Why don’t you wear your shoes on your ears?” or 
their heads toward the floor in response to “Why don’t you walk on your 
head?” and none of them seemed to be joking. The remaining children 
looked puzzled. One girl repeatedly asked “What?” Two low-group 
children gave corrections as reasons, such as “Drink milk” in 
response to “Why don’t you drink cookies?” 
The paucity of such linguistically simple but quite adequate informing 
responses suggests that the children’s poor performance was due more to 
cognitive difficulties than to productive linguistic deficiencies. Most of the 
children could have easily produced two-word utterances like “Drink milk,” 
but they generally did not seem able to justify verbally the impossibility or 
” Note that using physical context to support the intended interpretation of the test sentence 
is a departure from standard procedure. 
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implausibility of an action except by referring to their own inability to do 
the act. Perhaps “you” constrained the interpretation specifically to the 
self, or perhaps the children had no notion that talk can be about the 
feasibility of actions in general. Again, none of the children prefaced their 
remarks with “because.” 
Given the children’s responses to the setting sentences, it is not surpris- 
ing that many of them responded to the test sentence with action as well. 
Only three of the higher group children gave reasons for not doing the ac- 
tion. Again, “because” did not occur as a response. In general, then, the 
results on the “Why don’t you . . .” sentences corroborate the earlier 
results. If actions are at all possible as responses to speech, then children 
will try to perform them. But “Why don’t you . . .” seems especially 
conducive to action interpretations, even though children of this age have 
been reported to know that “why” questions can be answered with 
“because” (Ervin-Tripp, 1970). It may be that children learn the 
“why . . . because” sequence as a routine before seeing any relation at 
all between the “why” and “why don’t you” forms. 
Summary 
In situations where sentence and context work together to preclude 
action interpretations and support informing responses, children who have 
the ability to produce informing responses will do so. Therefore, children’s 
predominance of action responding in more ambiguous situations cannot 
result from difficulty in producing informing responses. The notion that ac- 
tion is the basic mode of response is again supported in several ways: (1) 
Children produce more action responses in directive contexts than inform- 
ing responses in informational contexts; (2) they make more action re- 
sponse “errors” in informational contexts than informing response 
“errors” in directive contexts; and (3) more sophisticated children pro- 
duce more informing responses in informational contexts than do less 
sophisticated children. A subtle kind of context, that provided by prior 
conversation, gradually exerts more influence on the developing child’s 
responses to sentences that can be taken in more than one way. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The Origins of the Response System 
I began with the following claim: Children’s apparent understanding of 
messages more linguistically sophisticated than those they can produce 
stems from their strategy of relating language to plausible and possible 
actions in the world. Their interpretations of messages are constrained 
not only by linguistic information but also by contextual information and 
by their representational capacities. I have examined their responses to a 
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variety of sentence types in a naturalistic setting (Shatz, 1978) as well as in 
a neutral setting and in two settings (directive and informational) designed 
to foster particular interpretations. In each of these situations the children 
showed strong tendencies to consider action a necessary part of their re- 
sponses. Taken together, these studies support the view that children first 
deal with language as a specifier of requisite actions appropriate to the 
context in which linguistic interaction takes place. One need not grant 
children more to explain their performance as listeners. 
Moreover, the notion that children first comprehend language in terms of 
its relationship to immediately possible actions on the world is consonant 
with recent proposals (e.g., Bates et al., 1975; Edwards, Note 2) that early 
speech productions mainly encode action-based relationships. The de- 
velopmental trends reported here demonstrate that children who evidence 
a broader understanding of the various messages language can convey also 
have better productive abilities. While these sorts of evidence do not 
confirm a single causal basis for both understanding and production, surely 
the child’s preoccupation with action relations in the world is one im- 
portant determinant of both what he understands and what he produces. 
The assumption that the linguistic signal is only one of several sources 
of information available in the communication setting for the interpretation 
of messages is hardly a controversial one. More at issue is the nature of 
and the relationship between the representations of linguistic information 
and contextual information. Searle’s pragmatic theory (Searle, 1970, 1975) 
suggests a psychological model in which the listener necessarily derives 
from the semantic and syntactic aspects of a sentence its literal meaning 
and then tests that for plausibility against contextual knowledge.g If literal 
meaning is basic to any further interpretation of utterances, then one of 
the first tasks facing the child just acquiring language should be to dis- 
cover which speaker intentions are directly expressed by which grammati- 
cal forms. One might then expect the child to respond to language first 
on the basis of these direct intention-grammar mappings, but the work 
presented here offers no evidence that the development of message 
interpretation progresses from a stage of assigning literal meanings to ut- 
terances to a stage in which indirect meanings can be assigned. While 
the work does not bear directly on the question of whether a purely linguis- 
tic representation is necessarily accessed in adult processing, it does dis- 
credit one theory of the development of message interpretation compatible 
with speech act theory. Moreover, it suggests that, at least for young 
children, general cognitive strategies for dealing with communicative situa- 
tions play a more central role in assigning meaning to messages than do 
strictly grammatical considerations. 
y It should be noted that Searle himself makes no claim to having a psychological 
theory. 
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Just as there is no justification for assigning the primary basis for re- 
sponding to grammatical knowledge, there is also no reason for rooting it in 
a prelinguistic understanding of speaker intentions. Although children 
demonstrate their own various intentions in prespeech or early speech 
behavior (Bates, et al., 1975; Dore 1974), such behavior offers no justifi- 
cation for granting them an understanding of the intentions of others. The 
response heuristic proposed here is not a mechanism for assigning speaker 
intentions. Rather it is an initial plan for producing responses to language 
which relate to the immediately perceptible world upon which the child 
can act. That early strategy limits the child to what Searle has called a 
words-to-world mapping (Searle, 1976), without entailing a claim that the 
child understands directive intentions better than or before informational 
ones, or even that he understands intentions at all. The proposals 
made here simply need not appeal to intention as an explanatory device 
for characterizing the interpretations of messages that seem to underlie 
children’s response behavior. This conclusion has been influenced by the 
conservative principle of assuming as little ability as necessary to account 
for the children’s behavior. While children, like adults, have been assumed 
to interpret messages with regard to their plausibility in context, plausi- 
bility need involve only a measure of the simplistic relation between 
the words heard and immediately possible actions.‘O 
Is the Predominance of Action Responding an Artifact? 
Although the tendency to respond with action has been well established, 
one can question whether responses are reliable indexes of listeners’ in- 
terpretations of messages, for a response may reflect how an utterance 
influences a listener as well as how it has been interpreted. Austin (1962) 
took account of this difference between the effect of an utterance and 
the understanding of it when he distinguished between perlocutionary 
force and illocutionary force. According to Austin, an utterance may have 
consequences for a listener’s behavior that are independent of the 
speaker’s intending them. For example, suppose a speaker announces 
plans to buy a certain book, intending only to inform the listener of the 
future purchase. The listener responds by offering to lend the speaker a 
copy of the book. The perlocutionary effect of the initial statement is the 
offer of lending although the original illocutionary act was a statement of 
intent to buy and not a request to borrow. The listener’s response may 
index a misunderstanding of the statement as a request, or he or she may 
have correctly understood it as a statement and decided on his or her own 
I0 Searle uses the direction of mapping as a criterion for categorizing illocutionary acts. 
His concern is for the mapping intended by the speaker, whereas mine is with the opera- 
tion carried out by a listener who may not even explicitly recognize speaker intentions. 
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to make the lending offer. Hence, his response is not informative with 
regard to interpretation. 
Reeder (Note 3) makes a similar point about children’s interpretations of 
indirect directives. Using a clever technique involving forced choices of 
paraphrases, he shows that preschoolers understand the difference be- 
tween informational and directive intentions even though they carry out 
the actions expressed in the utterances they hear regardless of the inten- 
tions behind the utterances. Thus, with a technique suitable for children 
older than my subjects, Reeder is able to show a sophistication of under- 
standing that is not evidenced by the children’s actions alone. It could be 
argued that, by examining only responses to speech, I have underestimated 
my subjects’ understanding of speaker intentions and overestimated the sig- 
nificance of action responses. 
If it were possible to use a technique like that of Reeder with 2-year-olds, 
then I might have found that children such as the oldest “2-year-olds” who 
participated here, did have the ability to understand speaker intentions. 
But evidence for an understanding of speaker intentions does not explain 
why action is so ubiquitous. Indeed, one may ask why Reeder’s subjects 
produced actions in response to virtually all the utterances they heard even 
when those actions were neither requisite nor particularly appropriate to 
the speaker’s intentions. Perhaps their tendency to respond to language by 
producing a words-to-world match was a vestige of the earlier response 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, given that young children like to play with toys and that 
in both Reeder’s and my situations they were allowed to do so, one can 
ask whether action responding was supported to an unusual degree by the 
availability of toys. Several kinds of evidence argue against this notion. 
For one thing, the children did not just play haphazardly with the toys. 
They tried to produce actions related to the utterances they heard. Second, 
in the contextual set experiment, one of the directive test sequences 
utilized no toys. Even without toys to act on, all 12 of the children who 
heard that sequence produced an action response to the test question, 
“Can you jump?“; not one produced an informing response. Also, the 
“Why don’t you . . .” setting sentences, despite their lack of feasibility, 
produced quite bizarre attempts at action more often than informing 
responses. The children seemed determined to produce action in response to 
speech if at all possible. 
Moreover, if the children had actually taken more of the test utterances 
to carry informational import, they could have given more informing 
responses regardless of their activities with the toys. The coding scheme 
did not assign merely any behavior pattern involving action to the action 
category. Both the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the child had to 
be consistent with such an assignment. The children produced consider- 
able amounts of speech during the interactions with adults but, as noted 
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earlier, much of it was superfluous to the analysis of interpretation. They 
had the ability to produce more informing responses, but they did not. 
Finally, other investigators have also recorded young children’s 
tendencies to respond with action under a multiplicity of conditions vary- 
ing from natural to quasi-experimental settings (Bloom, Rocissano, and 
Hood, 1976; Clark, Hutcheson, and van Buren, 1974; Ervin-Tripp, 1970; 
Wetstone and Friedlander, 1973). 
Developing into a Competent “Understander” 
How might children with only minimal abilities develop into more 
competent communicators? It seems reasonable to consider that ex- 
periences in communicative situations like those described earlier are im- 
portant factors. For it is there that children will find times when the ac- 
tion-based strategy is inappropriate or insufficient for dealing with the de- 
mands made upon them. Speakers sometimes intend listeners to do things 
and signal those intentions in messages involving speech. In those cases, 
words-to-world mappings generate appropriate responses, but speakers can 
have other intentions as well. I have suggested several possible ways 
children might gradually come to recognize these cases via linguistic 
and contextual stop-action markers. The identification of stop-action 
markers and data on their acquisition and effect upon response behavior 
would obviously lend credence to the developmental model proposed here. 
One bit of favorable evidence comes from Ervin-Tripp’s report (1970) 
that some children respond stereotypically to certain question words al- 
though they do not yet understand what the speaker intends to receive in 
the way of information. Apparently such children utilize the linguistic 
marker as a signal that action is inappropriate and are testing an alterna- 
tive strategy for staying in the interaction. 
Another avenue to development may be more direct feedback. When 
mothers are aware of their children’s misrepresentations, they may initiate 
“repair” sequences which attempt to correct misunderstandings. Investi- 
gation of this possibility is currently underway. 
Whatever the mechanisms of development, one thing is clear: Chil- 
dren make much progress at becoming good “understanders” during their 
early years. Both the behavior of the older subjects in these studies and 
the work of Reeder (Note 3) and Garvey (1975) provide evidence of that. 
But rapid achievements should not mislead us into denying the possibility 
of humble beginnings. My theory accounts for a considerable amount of 
early response behavior while granting children only those capacities that 
seem reasonable, given our knowledge of cognitive development and of 
adult comprehension processes. 
Children try to participate in conversation even before they know much 
about speaking the language, and they do so by using a simple response 
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strategy that utilizes what they know best. By regularly intending mes- 
sages requiring responses consonant with that strategy, parents encourage 
their children’s efforts and in the bargain are deceived by the children’s 
apparent competence at understanding. However, misunderstanding that 
their children understand may be a merciful palliative for parents. It 
would indeed be difficult to admit of a communications generation gap at so 
tender a stage of parent-child relations. 
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